english
Introduction
1. Since it the first and by his own [account] in the interest of any craftsman to consider the essential principles of his own art, therefore it is proper for us, intending to the essential principles of which, to know [the art] of grammar, among which are the modes of signifiying. But because it is thus that their learning is able to be had to the fullest without certain premises and tastings-before preceding the learning of those very things, we therefore ought to begin away from these [certain premises] just as from prior things.
Fourfold preamble
2. In the first [place], then, there are four things to be inquired into. The first is that, since art imitates nature as much as it can, from what, just as from a cause, the modes of signifying are taken. The second is whether the modes of being, modes of understanding, and modes of signifying differ or are the same. The third is, in what they may be just as in a subject. The fourth is, in what way the modes of signifying differ from a specific signified thing.
CHAPTER 1
From what just as from a cause the modes of signifying are taken.
3. About the first thing [to be inquired into], it ought to be known that the modes of signifying are taken from the modes of understanding just as from an immediate cause. For whatever touches knowing also touches signifying. And from the modes of being they {the modes of signifying} are taken as from a mediate cause, because they [are taken] with the modes of understanding mediating. And the modes of being are the properties of a thing according to the fact that the thing is outside the understanding. And the modes of understanding are the same properties of the thing according to the fact that the thing is in the understanding and as the same properties are understood with the thing. And the modes of signifying are the same properites in number according to the fact that the thing has been signified through voice.
4. And to this understanding it ought to be noted that the thing outside the understanding has many properties. For it has itself {exists} through the mode of habit and rest, and through the mode of agent and patient, and through the mode of singular and plural, and the rest. And things are distinguished from eachother through these properties. And all these properties of a thing existing outside the understanding are called the modes of being.
5. But the understanding, considering it with such properties, understands, concieves, or apprehends these properties in the thing itself, because the understanding itself understands a thing by understanding it with its properties, and the thing itself thus understood is called the thing understood, concieved, or apprehended, and its properties which previously were called the thing outside's modes of being, are called the modes of understanding of a thing understood.
6. Further, the understanding, in wishing to signify its concept to another, imposes voice onto the thing understood so that its concept, that is, the thing understod, is expressed through voice just as through a sign. Hence just as the barkeep signifies wine by a circle, in the same way the understanding expresses or signifies the thing understood by voice, and after coupling with or imposition of voice, the thing itself is called the thing signified, and all the properties of a thing which first were called the modes of being of a thing outside, and the modes of understanding a thing understood, now are called the modes of signifying. And this the first [thing to be inquired into] is clear, namely, that the modes of signifying are taken from things' properties, which are the modes of being.
CHAPTER 2
Whether the modes of being, modes of understanding, and modes of signifying are the same or differ.
7. About the second thing [to be inquired into], it ought to be noted that the modes of being and modes of understanding and modes of signifying are the inwardly the same, which is clear from what was said, they nevertheless differ accidentally. And the proof of this is: just as a thing has itself {exists as} outside, understood, and signified, so do the modes of being, understanding, and signifying have themselves. But a thing outside, understood, and signified are one and thesame thing. Hence also the modes of being, the modes of understanding, and themodes of signifying are inwardly the same, though they differ by happenings{accidentally}, that is, with [respect to] sign and thing signified. And it is saidby example: just as Socrates now in the room, now in the choir, now outside is oneand the same Socrates in number, although accidentally he is not the same, becausehe differs according to diverse "where"s, it is similar among the aforesaid modes. Hence the modes of being, modes of understanding, and modes of signifying are the same, although they differ accidentally, that is, with [respect to] diverse "where"s.
8. A mode of signifying does not have itself to the modes of understanding andbeing as a sign [does] to a thing signified, as some say. For just as the winesignified by the circle is not, but the substance of the circle is, a sign of winein the cellar, in the same way, a mode of signifiying is not a sign of the modes of understanding and the modes of being, since nothing is able to be a sign of itself, by what means they are the same inwardly, and thus one will not be a signof the other, but the sign of them is voice, because voice signifies a thing andconsignifies the properties of the thing.
CHAPTER 3
In what the modes of signifying are just as in a subject.
9. About the third thing [to be inquired into] it ought to be that the modes ofbeing are in a thing outside just as in a subject; and the modes of underatandingare in the thing understood just as in a subject, and by consequence are in the understanding just as the known is in the knower; and the modes of signifying are in the thing signified just as in a subject and are in voice just as in a sign.
10. And it ought to be known that voice is considered by the grammarian accidentally. Because all that is able to be a sign of a thing signified likewise is able to be of the consideration of the grammarian. But because voice is moresuitable a sign than something else, such as a nod of the head or a wink of the eye or things of this kind, therefore it is considered more by the grammarian, and it ought to be understood that this is accidentally.
CHAPTER 4
In what way the modes of signifying differ from a specific signified thing.
11. About the fourth thing [to be inquired into] it ought to be noted that amode of signifying and a specific signified thing thus differ because theunderstanding, apprehending a thing outside as was said, couples itself with voiceand the thing that through it is represented is the specific thing signified.Hence a specific thing signified is nothing other than an understood thingrepresented through voice. And this is the coupling [with] or imposition [of] voice, which from antiquity was called the first articulation of voice.
12. And it ought to be known that just as a thing is distinguished [from another] through its properties, so the parts of speech are [distinguished] throughtheir modes of signifying. Now the mode of signification is the form of the part of speech, because it gives it existence and distinguishes it from every other part of speech other than itself. For every part of speech is a part through its mode of signifying.
13. Moreover, it ought to be noted that a sign, a word, a part of speech, and a term differ this way. A sign is that which has the purpose {rationem} ofsignifying something such as a circle or things of this kind. A word is voice having the purpose {rationem} of signifying something, such as this word "man". For one says to me something composed of the voice signifying and the thing signified. Hence signs and words do not differ on the part of what one signifies, but on the part of eachothers's substance. For [the genus] "sign" has more [species] in it than [the genus] "word", because every word can be called a sign, but not the other way around, because "sign" is able to be said of a nod of the head, of a voice, or of others; but "word" is only said of voice. But "part of speech" signifies thesame, while it nevertheless has a mode of signifying, because, although a thing and its properties exist together, the understanding is nevertheless able to understand them separatedly or dividedly, that is, one before the other, and thus [is able] to couple dividedly[1]. Now a term is a word or part of speech and is said from "terminating", because it terminates the whole resolution of the logician. For thelogician is not able to go beyond the term, because he resolves the syllogism into propositions, and he resolves the propositions into the subject and predicate, which are the terms of the logician. Hence subject and predicate are denominated by diverse position. Therefore these four things considered which are necessary for the learning of the modes of signifying are clear.
CHAPTER 5
On the essential general modes of signifying.
14. These things being had, the very modes of signifying ought to be spoken of, and first, of the eight essential general modes of signifying, each of which forms one part of speech. For every part of speech is a part through its general essential mode of signifying. Now, it is called essential to the extent that itis of the essence of any [species] contained under it. For every higher [genus] isof the essence of its lower [species]. And it is called general to the extent that it generally applies to whatever is contained under it, or it is called general with respect to specific modes, or because no other mode of signifying is supervening above it. Seeing that the ten kinds of things comprehending under themselves the essence and entity of every being, which are substance, quality, and the rest, each of which has its own predicamental column, thus we are able to imagine the predicamental column in these modes of signifying. For each of these eight modes of signifying has itself {exists} in the mode of the most general genus.
15. Therefore first let us see about these things in general, second under these by descending into the particular. Therefore first, about a noun's essential general mode of signifying, second, about [that] of a pronoun, and likewise aboutthe other modes of signifying of other parts of speech in order.
CHAPTER 6
On a noun's essential general mode [of signifying].
16. A noun's general essential mode of signifying is the mode of signifying through the mode of habit and rest, and through the mode of determinate apprehension, and this mode of signifying is what makes every noun to be a noun. To the understaniding of which it ought to be noted that this mode of signifying is composed or made from two, namely from the mode of habit and rest, and the mode ofdeterminate apprehension. And because every composite by necessity wants to be composed of matter and form -- for every composition requires these two -- therefore it ought to be known what of this is matter and what is form. Note therefore that the mode of habit and rest is the matter in the noun's essential general mode of signifying, and the mode of determinate apprehension is the form. This same thing is insisted upon in the saying of antiquity that every noun signifies substance with quality. But this ought to be understood modally. For not every name signifies substance with quality. For certain nouns signify the privation of a habit, such as blindness and things of this kind, and certain [nouns signify] privations of all beings, such as nothing and the like. For such [nouns] signify no substance. Hence when it is said a noun signifies substance with quality, this ought to be related back to the modes and it ought to be said that a noun signifies through the mode of substance and through the mode of quality. And thus the mode of habit and rest, which is matter to the noun, corresponds to the mode of substance, and the mode of determinate apprehension corresponds to the mode of quality, which is formal.
17. And the mode of determinate apprehension is well-said to be the form of a name, because it is distinguished from other parts of speech through this mode just as through its own form. For everything that is, is through its form, and through its form it is understood and distinguished from others. For universally the form allows a thing to be and, with this, to be distinguished, and conserves the thing in being and is the reason or principle of understanding and learning the thing of which it is.
18. From this it is clear that this mode of signifying of a noun, namely of habit and rest and determinate apprehension is taken from the material and formal modes of being: for the mode of habit and rest [is taken] from the material mode of being, [and] the mode of determinate apprehension from the formal mode of being. And because the mode of habit and rest follows from matter, but the mode of determinate apprehension is owed to form, then it is clear that this mode is composed from the material and formal. And because the understanding finds or knows such a mode of signifying of a thing's name not contradictory to the thing, therefore it thus, according to the thing ascertained, is assigned such a part of speech and in this way the noun is distinguished from other parts of speech.
CHAPTER 7
On a pronoun's essential general mode of signifying.
19. A pronoun's mode of signifying is a mode of signifying through the mode of habit and rest. For through this mode a pronoun is a pronoun. Hence this that is the matter in the noun's mode of singifying is the form and what is apt to complete the pronoun. For this is the pronoun's mode of signifying. For the pronoun does not signify through the mode of determinate apprehension just as a noun signifies. For in a concise explanation and report, pronouns are pointless and vain, because through it, nothing determinate is apprehended. Therefore it signifies through the mode of habit and rest alone, which is its form and is the whole of a pronoun's essential general mode of signifying. And this is shared with the noun, because both signify through the mode of habit and rest. Through this, then, the mode is distinguished from from all other parts of speech besides from the noun, from which it also differs, because a noun signifies through the mode of habit and rest and through the mode of determinate apprehension, but a pronoun [signifies] through the mode of habit and rest alone. Hence it is said from antiquity that a noun signifies substance with quality, but a pronoun pure substance, that is, without quality. And thus the pronoun differs from the noun, because the pronoun signifies through the mode of habit and rest alone, that is, through the mode of pure substance; but this mode is taken from the material mode of being in the way that was said. Therefore a pronoun's mode of signifying is the mode of habit and rest or the mode of pure substance, it is bare or not with quality or of indeterminate apprehension.
CHAPTER 8
On a verb's essential general mode of signifying.
20. A verb's essential general mode of signifying is a mode of signifying through the mode of becoming distant from substance. To this understanding it ought to be noted that since every mode of signifying is taken from a mode of being or a property of a thing, therefore it ought to considered: from what mode of being is this mode taken. Note therefore that this certain [thing] is the mobile thing's disposition or property of not resting, which is motion, which is an accident of a mobile thing. But this motion is either <generation or corruption or> accidental alteration in accidents or growth or diminution or according to change in location. But each of these motions has itself {is} through the mode of flow or through the mode of succession or through the mode of continuing what is the same. But in this flow or continuous thing we are able to imagine something indivisible anywhere in a continuous thing, such as a point on a line, and this is instant. And generation is taken from this, because matter arranged in the present is introduced by generation and similiarly by corruption. For a thing is not corrupted in succession, but everything [is corrupted] in an instant. Now, what it is to make is comprised of these, namely succession and being instantly. For it is comprised of divisible and indivisible things. Hence since the modes of signifying are taken from the modes of being and since certain words are verbs which signify a thing's own as now and present or through the mode of presenting, such as "to beget", "to destroy", and similar ones, and certain words signify a thing's own successively or through the mode of succession, as in this verb, "to run", and similar ones, and this making verb contains or comprises both under it. From this it is the case that a verb's very mode of signifying is to signify through the mode of making and this is the matter in the verb's mode of signifying. And this mode, namely, the mode of making, is comprised of acting, suffering, and the neuter [voice]. But these together are making.
21. Likewise, a verb signifies through the mode of distance, because the verb is the other most important part of a statement, distancing from substance as a roof is said to be distant from the foundation and this distance in the verb's essential mode of signifying is formal. Now, I understand this [as] distance to this extent: that from it the word is not immediately able to be joined to the other extremity. From this it is clear that the verb signifies through the mode of making distance.
latin
Prooemium
1. Cum cuiuslibet artificis principia essentialia suae artis primo et per se interist considerare, nos igitur grammaticae intendentes eius principia essentialia, cuiusmodi sunt modi significandi, scire oportet. Sed quia ita est quod eorum cognitio sine quibusdam praemissis et praelibatis cognitionem ipsorum antecedentibus ad plenum haberi non potest, ideo ab his tamquam a prioribus inchoandum est.
Quatuor praeambula
2. In primis igitur quatuor inquirenda sunt. Primum est, cum ars imitetur naturam in quantum potest, a quo tamquam a causa modi significandi sint accepti. Secundum est, utrum modi essendi, modi intelligendi et modi significandi differant vel sint idem. Tertium est, in quo sint sicut in subiecto. Quartum est, quomodo modi significandi differant a significato speciali.
CAPUT I
A quo tamquam a causa modi significandi sint accepti.
3. Circa primum sciendum est quod modi significandi accepti sunt a modis intelligendi sicut a causa immediata. Quidquid enim contingit intelligere, contingit et significare. Et a modis essendi accepti sunt sicut a causa mediata, quia mediantibus modis intelligendi. Modi autem essendi sunt proprietates rei secundum quod res est extra intellectum. Modi autem intelligendi sunt eaedem proprietates rei secundum quod res est in intellectu et ut eaedem proprietates cum re sunt intellectae. Modi autem significandi eaedem proprietates sunt in numero secundum quod res est significata per vocem.
4. Et ad hoc intelligendum notandum est quod res extra intellectum multas habet proprietates. Habet enim se per modum habitus et quietis et per modum agentis et patientis et per modum singularis et pluralis et cetera. Et per istas proprietates distinguuntur res ab invicem. Omnes autem istae proprietates rei extra intellectum existentes dicuntur modi essendi.
5. Intellectus vero in re ipsa istas proprietates considerans eam cum talibus proprietatibus intelligit, concipit sive apprehendit, quia ipse intellectus intelligit rem cointelligendo eius proprietate, et ipsa res sic intellecta dicitur res intellecta, concepta sive apprehensa, et eius proprietates quae prius dicebantur modi essendi rei extra dicuntur modi intelligendi rei intellectae.
6. Ulterius intellectus volens alii conceptum suum significare, rei intellectae vocem imponit, ut eius conceptus scilicet res intellecta per vocem tamquam per signum exprimatur. Unde sicut tabernarius vinum significat per circulum, eodem modo intellectus rem intellectam exprimit sive significat per vocem, et post copulationem sive impositionem vocis ipsa res dicitur res significata, et omnes proprietates rei quae prius dicebantur modi essendi rei extra et modi intelligendi rei intellectae, iam dicuntur modi significandi. Et sic patet primum, scilicet quod modi significandi a proprietatibus rerum quae sunt modi essendi sunt accepti.
CAPUT II
Utrum modi essendi, modi intelligendi et modi significandi sunt idem
vel differunt.
7. Circa secundum notandum quod modi essendi et modi intelligendi et modi significandi sunt idem penitus quod patet ex dictis, defferunt tamen accidentaliter. Et huius probatio est: sicut se habet res extra, inellecta et significata, sic se havent modi essendi, modi intelligendi, et modi significandi. Sed res extra, intellecta, et significata sunt una et eaedem res. Quare et modi essendi, modi intelligendi et modi significandi sunt idem penitus, licet differant per accidens, scilicet penes signum et significatum. Et declaratur in simili: sicut Socrates nunc in camera, nunc in choro, nunc in foro est unus et idem Socrates in numero, licet per accidens non sit idem, quia differt secundum diversa ubi, similiter est in istis modis. Unde modi essendi, modi intelligendi, et modi significandi sunt idem, licet differant accidentaliter, scilicet penes diversa ubi.
8. Nec se habet modus significandi ad modum intelligendi et essendi sicut signum ad significatum ut quidam dicunt. Nam sicut vinum significatum per circulum non est signum vini in cellario, sed substantia circuli, eodem modo modus significandi non est signum modi intelligendi et modi essendi, cum nihil possit esse signum sui ipsius, quare penitus sunt idem, et ita unum non erit signum alterius, sed eorum signum est vox, quia vox significat rem et consignificat proprietates rei.
CAPUT III
In quo modi significandi sint sicut in subiecto.
9. Circa tertium notandum quod modi essendi sunt in re extra sicut in subiecto; modi autem intelligendi in re intellecta sicut in subiecto et per consequens in intellectu sicut cognitum in cognoscente; modi autem significandi sunt in re significata sicut in subiecto et in voce sicut in signo.
10. Et sciendum quod vox per accidens consideratur a grammatico. Quia omne quod potest esse signum rei significatae, etiam potest esse de consideratione grammatici. Sed quia box est habilius signum quam aliquid aliud utpote nutus corporeus et conniventia oculorum et huiusmodi, ideo plus consideratur a grammatico, et intelligendum quod hoc est per accidens.
CAPUT IV
Quomodo modi significandi differant a significato speciali.
11. Circa quartum notandum quod modus significandi et significatum speciale sic differunt quia intellectus apprehendens rem extra, ut dictum est, copulat sibi vocem et id quod per ipsam repraesentatur est significatum speciale. Unde significatum speciale nihil aliud est quam intellectum per vocem repraesentatum. Et haec est copulatio sive impositio vocis quae ab antiquis dicebantur prima articulatio vocis. Modis autem significandi est proprietas rei consignificata per vocem.
12. Et sciendum quod sicut res distinguitur per suas proprietates, ita partes orationis per suos modos significandi. Modus autem significandi est forma partis orationis qua dat esse et distinguit eam ab omni parte orationis alia a se. Omnies enim pars orationis est pars per suum modum significandi.
13. Notandum autem quod signum, dictio, pars orationis et terminus differunt hoc modo. Signum est quod habet rationem significandi aliquid ut ciculus vel huiusmodi. Dictio est vox habens rationem significandi aliquid ut haec dictio homo. Dicit enim mihi aliquid compositum ex voce significante et re significata. Unde signum et dictio non differunt a parte eius quod significantur, sed a parte substantiae utriusque. Signum enim in plus se habet quam dictio, quia omnis dictio potest dici signum, sed non e converso, quia signum potest dici de nutu corporeo, de voce et de aliis; dictio autem tantum de voce dicitur. Pars vero orationis idem significat, cum hoc tamen habet modum significandi, quia licet res et eius proprietates simul sint, tamen intellectus potest eas separatim sive divisim intelligere, id est unum praeter aliud, et sic divisim copulare. Terminus autem est dictio sive pars orationis et dicitur a terminando, quia terminat totam resolutionem loyci. Loycus enim non potest ire ultra terminum, quia resolvit sillogismum in propositiones, propositiones autem in subiectum et praedicatum, qui sunt termini loyci. Unde subiectum et praedicatum a diverso situ denominatur. Sic ergo patent ista quatuor dubitata quae sunt necessaria ad cognitionem modorum significandi.
CAPUT V
De modis significandi essentialibus generalibus.
14. His habitis dicendum est de ipsis modis significandi et primo de octo modis significandi essentialibus generalibus, quorum quilibet constituit unam partem orationis. Nam omnis pars orationis est pars per suum modum significandi essentialiem generalem. Dicitur autem essentialis pro tanto, quia est de essentia cuiuslibet sub se contenti. Nam omne superius est de essentia sui inferioris. Dicitur autem generalis pro tanto, quia generaliter cuilibet sub se contento convenit, vel dicitur generalis respectu modorum specialum vel quia supra ipsum nullus alius modus significandi est superveniens. Utpote sunt decem genera rerum sub se essentiam et entitatem omnium entium comprehendentia quae sunt substantia, qualitas, quantitas et cetera, quorum quodlibet habet suam ordinationem sive lineam praedicamentalem, sic imaginari possumus lineam praedicamentalem in his modis significandi. Nam quilibet istorum octo modorum significandi se habet per modum generis generalissimi.
15. De his ergo primo videamus in generali, secundo sub his in speciali descendendo. Primo ergo de modo significandi essentiali generali nominis, secundo pronomis et sic de aliis modis significandi aliarum partium orationis secundum ordinem.
CAPUT VI
De modo essentiali generali nominis.
16. Modus significandi essentialis generalis nominis est modus significandi per modum habitus et quietis et per modum determinatae apprehensionis, et hic modus significandi est qui facit omne nomen esse nomen. Ad cuius intelligentiam est notandum quod iste modus significandi est compositus sive confectus ex duobus, scilicet ex modo habitus et quietis et ex modo determinatae apprehensionis. Et quia omne compositum ex necessitate vult componi ex materia et forma -- nam omne compositum haec duo requirit -- ideo sciendum quid illorum sit materiale et quid formale. Nota ergo quod modus habitus et quietis materialis est in modo significandi essentiali generali nominis, modus autem determinatae apprehensionis est formalis. Hoc idem exposuerunt antiqui dicentes quod omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate. Hoc autem modaliter intelligendum est. Nam non omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate. Quaedam enim nomina significant privationem habitus ut caecitas et huiusmodi et quaedam privationem omnium entium ut nihil et talia. Nam talia nullam substantiam significant. Unde cum dicitur nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, hoc retorquendum est ad modos et est dicendum quod nomen significat per modum substantiae et per modum qualitatis. Et sic modus habitus et quietis qui est materialis nomini respondet modo substantiae, et modus determinatae apprehensionis respondet modo qualitatis qui est formalis.
17. Et bene dicitur modus determinatae apprehensionis sive modus qualitatis esse formalis in nomine, quia per hunc tamquam per suam formam distinguitur ab aliis partibus orationis. Omne enim quod est per suam formam est et per suam formam intelligitur et ab aliis distinguitur. Universaliter enim forma dat esse rei et cum hoc esse distinctum et conservat rem in esse et est ratio sive principium intelligendi id cuius est et cognoscendi.
18. Ex hoc patet quod iste modus significandi nominis, scilicet habitus et quietis et determinatae apprehensionis a modis essendi materiae et formae est acceptus: nam modus habitus et quietis a modo essendi materiae, modus determinatae apprehensionis a modo essendi formae. Et quia modus habitus et quietis consequitur materiam, modus autem determinatae apprehensionis debetur formae, ideo patet quod hic modus ex materiali et formali compositus est. Et quia intellectus talem modum significandi rei nominis non repugnantem in re invenit sive cognovit, ideo ipsum sic in re repertum attribuit tali parti orationis et per hunc modum distinguitur nomen ab aliis partibus orationis.
CAPUT VII
De modo significandi essentiali generali pronomis.
19. Modus significandi pronomis est modus significandi per modum habitus et quietis. Per hunc enim modum pronomen est pronomen. Unde quod materiale est in modo significandi nominis, hoc est formale et completivum pronominis. Hic enim est modus significandi pronominis. Pronomen enim non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis sicut nomen significat. Nam circumscripta demonstratione et relatione pronomina cassa sunt et vana, quia per ipsa nihil determinate apprehenditur. Ideo significat per modum habitus et quietis solum quod est sibi formale et est totus modus significandi essentialis generalis pronominis. Et in hoc communicat cum nomine, quia utrumque significat per modum habitus et quietis. Per hunc autem modum distinguitur ab omnibus partibus orationis nisi a nomine, a quo tamen differt, quia nomen significat per modum habitus et quietis et per modum determinatae apprehensionis, pronomen vero per modum habitus et quietis solum. Unde dixerunt antiqui quod nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, pronomen autem substantiam meram, id est sine qualitate. Et ita pronomen a nomine differt, quia pronomen significat per modum habitus et quietis solum, id est per modum substantiae merae; his autem modus accipitur a modo essendi materiae quemadmodum dictum est. Modus igitur significandi pronominis est modus habitus et quietis sive modus substantiae merae, id est nudae vel non cum qualitate vel indeterminatae apprehensionis.
CAPUT VIII
De modo significandi essentiali generali verbi.
20. Modus significandi essentialis generalis verbi est modus significandi per modum fieri distantis a substantia. Ad cuius intelligentiam est notandum quod cum omnis modus significandi a modo essendi sive a proprietate rei sit acceptus, ideo videndum est a quo modo essendi hic modus sit acceptus. Nota ergo quod quaedam est dispositio sive proprietas rei mobilis non quiescentis quae est motus qui est accidens rei mobilis. Hic autem motus vel est <generatio vel corruptio vel> alteratio accidentis in accidens vel augmentum vel diminutio vel secundum locum mutatio. Quilibet autem istorum motuum habet se per modum fluxus sive per modum sucessionis sive per modum continui quod idem est. In hoc vero fluxu sive continuo imaginari possumus aliquid indivisibile sicut in quolibet continuo ut punctum in linea et hoc est instans. Et ab hoc accipitur generatio quia materia disposita in instanti introducitur generatio et similiter corruptio. Non enim per successionem aliqua corrumpuntur, sed omnio in instanti. Haec autem, scilicet successionem et instans, hoc quod est fier complectitur. Nam divisible et indivisible complectitur. Unde cum modus significandi a modo essendi accipiatur et cum quaedam sint verba quae significant rem suam ut nunc et instans sive per modum instantis ut genero, -as, corrumpu, -is, et similia, quaedam autem significent rem suam successive sive per modum successionis ut in hoc verbo curro, -is, et similia, et hoc verbum fieri utrumque sub se comprehendit sive complectitur. Ex hoc est quod modus significandi ipsius verbi est significare per modum fieri et hoc est materiale in modo significandi verbi. Et hic modus, scilicet modus fieri complectitur agere vel pari vel neutrum. His autem fieri commune est.
21. Significat etiam verbum per modum distantis, quia verbum est altera pars orationis vel enuntiationis principalior, distans a substantia ut tectum dicitur a fundamento distare et haec distantia in modo significandi essentiali verbi est formalis. Hanc autem distantiam intelligo pro tanto, ex eo quod verbum per immediationem alteri extremo copulari non potest. Unde distantia nihil aliud est quam incomposibilitas in extremis. Ex his patet quod verbum significat per modum fieri distantis.